The political economy of antitrust [electornic resources] / edited by Johan Stennek.
- 其他作者：
- 出版： Bingley, U.K. : Emerald 2007.
- 叢書名： Contributions to economic analysis ,v. 282
- 主題： Business & Economics--Economics , Business & Economics--International , Industry & industrial studies , Political economy , Economics , Antitrust law
- ISBN： 9781849508667
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- 一般註：Includes index 99年度中區共購共享電子書 Issues in antitrust enforcement / Johan Stennek -- Instruments for cartel deterrence, and conflicts of interests / Câecile Aubert -- Lessons for competition policy from the vitamins cartel / Matthew E. Raiff --Effectiveness of antitrust sanctions on modern international cartels /John M. Connor -- The economics of tacit collusion : implications for merger control / Jean Tirole -- The economics and politics of international merger enforcement : a case study of the GE/Honeywell merger / JayPil Choi -- Remembrance of things past : antitrust, ideology, and the development of industrial economics / Stephen Martin -- The political economy of EU merger control : small vs. large member states / Johan Stennek -- A consumer surplus defense in merger control / Sven-Olof Fridolfsson -- EU mergerremedies : an empirical assessment / Burcin Yurtoglu-- The significant impediment of effective competition test in the newEuropean merger regulation : in theory and practice / Marc Ivaldi -- Verticalrestraints and the effects of upstream horizontal mergers / Gregory J. Werden -- Political stabilization by an independent regulator /David Martimort -- Saving section 2 : reframing U.S. monopolization law / Timothy J. Brennan -- Private antitrust litigation : procompetitiveor anticompetitive? / Sue H. Mialon -- Antitrust in open economies / Henrik Horn -- The impact of the corporate leniency program on cartel formation and the cartel price path / Joseph E. Harrington Jr -- Optimal fines in theera of whistleblowers : should price fixers still go to prison? / Giancarlo Spagnolo
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讀者標籤：
- 系統號： 000218763 | 機讀編目格式
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摘要註
Motivated by recent events and experiences in antitrust enforcement and policy in the United States and the European Union, and new insights and findings from academic research, this book presents a collection of theoretical, empirical and public policy-oriented articles representing recent research on the political-economy of antitrust. Political-economy is defined broadly to include the demand-side drivers of antitrust activity such as market failures and interest-groups, along with supply-side drivers including ideology and partisan politics as well as theimportance of informational limitations in antitrust enforcement and the institutional structure of the antitrust agencies. Examining issues related to the political-economy of antitrust is important as antitrustpolicy and enforcement provide a key mechanism for preserving the competitiveness of markets, with implications for innovation, efficiency, growth and welfare. This book brings together contributions by leading academic researchers in the areas of political-economy, cartels, merger and non-merger enforcement, as well as economists working with antitrust authorities in the U.S. and E.U., to make a timely contribution for researchers and practitioners. The chapters in this volume cover the full range of topics: enforcement of cartels; merger control; monopolization and abuse of dominance; and systemic issues inantitrust enforcementand policy. Since the last few years have seen significant changes in both theU.S. and E.U. in the attitudes towards cartels, the book places emphasis on antitrust enforcement of cartels, including topics such as the corporate leniency programs that have recently been introduced inthe U.S. and E.U., optimal deterrence mechanisms against cartels and detection of cartels. While the individual chapters of the book make independent contributions and may be read separately, thebook brings together articles from various sub-areas to present a more encompassing picture. The first
